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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
viso,' 7 the unique character of custody proceedings,"8 and the lack
of a strong foundation for the physician-patient privilege 0 all strong-
ly favor this step. It is in fact necessary to return the "polar star"
to its rightful position. 0
WILLIAM J. DOCKERY
Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physician's Opinion
Based on Patient's Statements
In Todd v. Watts,' plaintiff sought damages for persistent head-
aches and backaches allegedly resulting from injuries she had sus-
tained in an automobile collision. Her evidence showed a collision,
and that she had been thrown forward, striking her head on the
windshield, her knees on the dashboard and wrenching her back.
An orthopedic surgeon who had treated plaintiff testified in her
behalf. He first related the history of the complaints, as told by
the plaintiff on her first visit to him for treatment. This testimony
included reference to the accident and a recitation that she told him
"she was thrown forward when the collision occurred, striking her
head and forehead against the front windshield glass, breaking the
glass and abrading her forehead. She told me... she also wrenched
and contused both knees and her low back."2 There was no objection
to this testimony, although on request of defense counsel its use
was limited to corroborating the testimony previously given by the
plaintiff.' The doctor then was asked to give certain opinions as
17 The proviso was inserted by the legislature to prevent the privilege from
serving as a bar to justice.
"s As noted above, time may be a controlling factor in this type of litiga-
tion. Also, it may be extremely important to the welfare of the child that the
initial determination be correct.
" See Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Jitstice Served or Ob-
structed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L.J.
607 (1943).
" The question of whether to remove a child from the custody of its
natural mother is one over which judges have agonized from time im-
memorial. See In re Two Mothers, 1 Kings 3:11-28, decided by King Solo-
mon, evidently the first 'reported' case. Klein v. Klein, 204 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1580 (1967).
1269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967). For a previous discussion of this
case, see Brandis, Evidence, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L.
REv. 934, 949-51 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Brandis].
2269 N.C. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451-52 (dissenting opinion).
'Id. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451. This seems consistent with North Caro-
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to the permanency and cause of plaintiff's continuing pains. Over
objection, he was permitted: (1) to give his diagnosis, which in-
cluded reference to both the accident and the resultant injuries;
(2) to answer that, in his opinion, plaintiff would suffer "some
continuing lumbo-sacral strain and persistent headaches as a result
of her auto accident;" and (3) to answer that a congenital spine
defect found in plaintiff could have been aggravated by an injury
received in the accident.4 The jury awarded damages to the plaintiff.
The North Carolina Supreme Court awarded a new trial (Chief
Justice Parker dissenting), solely because of error in admitting
this testimony.
The majority held that allowing the physician to express an
opinion based on matter beyond his personal knowledge and not
properly grounded upon a hypothetical question was error. The
dissenting Chief Justice relied on the earlier case of Penland v.
Bird Coal Company' (which the majority did not mention). That
case held a treating physician's opinion to be admissible although
based wholly or in part on statements of the patient and allowed
the physician to testify to the statements in order to show the basis
for his opinion, even when not admissible as substantive evidence.6
As a result of the majority holding, the viability of the Penland
rule is open to serious question.
In considering the effect of Todd on the Penland decision, certain
related problems should be distinguished. As a practical matter, a
doctor might be called upon to testify to what his patient told him
for one of two reasons. First, the testimony might be sought as
substantive evidence, i.e., to prove the truth of the matter stated.
7
This is clearly hearsay8 and, to be admissible, it must fall under
lina's liberal use of the "corroboration" rule to allow testimony otherwise ex-
cludable as hearsay. See, e.g., Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519, 81
S.E. 746 (1914). The rule is discussed in D. STANSRURY, THE NORTH CARO-
LI A LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 50-52 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANS-
BURY].
'269 N.C. at 419-20, 152 S.E.2d at 450-51.
246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
Id. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.
"See, e.g., Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712
(1958).
8 "[W]henever the assertion of any person, other than that of the witness
himself in his present testimony, is offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, the evidence so offered is hearsay." STANSBURY § 138, at 336.
See also C. McCoRmICK, L&w OF EVIDENCE § 225 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].
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one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.0 Second, the
doctor might base his opinion on his patient's statements and repeat
the statements only to show the grounds for his opinion.10 In the
former instance, due to a high degree of trustworthiness," most
courts allow a witness (physician or layman) to testify to a person's
statements of present pain and suffering as substantive evidence. 2
Admitting a patient's statements to his treating physician of past
symptoms seems equally trustworthy,' 8 and courts are beginning
to adopt this view.14 If the patient's statements concern the supposed
cause of his injuries or illness, they are usually not admissible to
prove the occurrence of the causal event.'
Although some courts fail to recognize it,'" the hearsay problems
'Professor Wigmore described the requirements for allowing hearsay
testimony as being (1) necessity, and (2) a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
0 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me. 1966).
1 See WIGMOE §§ 1421-22, 1718.
" See Biles v. Holmes, 33 N.C. 16 (1850) (statements to physician);
Salinas v. Casualty Co. of California, 323 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
(statements to layman). Many North Carolina cases recognizing this ex-
ception to the hearsay rule are collected in Note, 13 N.C.L. REv. 228 (1935).
" "A patient has an equal motive to speak the truth; what he has felt
in the past is as apt to be important in his treatment as what he feels at the
moment." Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1940) (L.
Hand, J.). For obvious reasons, statements of past symptoms to a layman
would not be imbued with a similar motive for truth, and thus the hearsay
exception as applied to laymen does not extend beyond declarations of present
pain and suffering. See WIGMORE § 1722. Note further that the reasons for
the hearsay exception are not so readily applicable when the physician is
consulted only to qualify him to testify. See note 20 infra.
"' Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940) ; accord, Peter-
son v. Richfield Plaza, 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712 (1958) (overruling
prior inconsistent cases). North Carolina has approached, if not adopted,
this exception. See Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N.C. 711, 175 S.E. 96
(1934), noted in 13 N.C.L. Rlv. 228 (1935).
' Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439 (1882); Pinter v. Parsekian, 92
N.J. Super. 392, 223 A.2d 635 (Super. Ct. 1966); WIGMORE § 1722. But cf.
Hillman v. Utah Power & Light Co., 56 Idaho 67, 51 P.2d 703 (1935);
Greenfarb v. Arre, 62 N.J. Super. 420, 163 A.2d 173 (Super. Ct. 1960)
(patient deceased, no other testimony as to cause available), petition for
cert. denied, 33 N.J. 454, 165 A.2d 233 (1960) ; MCCORMICK § 266.
"0See Paulk v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 436, 154 S.E.2d 872 (1967);
Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1962); Reid v. Yellow
Cab Co., 131 Ore. 27, 279 P. 635 (1929). In Reid, a concurring justice
pointed out: "The prevailing opinion fails to recognize the distinction be-
tween receiving in evidence the communications of a patient to his physician
as proof of the truth of the matter stated and admitting them for the pur-
pose of showing the basis of the physician's judgment." Id. at 35-36, 279
P. at 638 (discussing the distinction).
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set out above are not involved when the treating physician gives
his opinion grounded on the patient's subjective statements and
relates this history only to show the basis for the opinion.1 Testi-
mony is not generally objectionable as hearsay if introduced for
any reason other than to prove the truth of the matter stated.18
Absent these hearsay considerations, there seems no logical basis
for differentiating between opinions based on patient's statements
of present pain and suffering, past symptoms or cause. Courts not
applying hearsay rules to physician opinion testimony usually do
not make these distinctions. 9 Finally, the above rules which allow
admission of patient's statements, either as substantive evidence
or as basis for opinion, usually do not extend to statements made
by the plaintiff to a non-treating physician0 or to statements made
to the treating physician by a third party (rather than the patient).21
This note is confined to the Todd context of statements made by a
patient to a treating physician and referred to by the physician during
the trial only as indicating basis for opinion.
As pointed out by the dissenting Chief Justice in Todd, the gen-
eral rule is that a treating physician may base his opinion on state-
"' "In such an instance the patient's statements are not regarded as
hearsay; the statements are introduced without regard for the truthfulness
of the fact stated, but merely as observed facts forming part of the phys-
ician's data." Gonzales v. Hodson, 420 P.2d 813, 816 (Idaho 1966). In-
structions that the statements are to be considered only in explanation of the
physician's opinion should counteract any tendency of the jury to use the
evidence as proof of the facts stated. Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me.
1966).
z$ STANSBURY § 141.
"0 See WIG'oRE § 688.
"'Most courts exclude patient's statements as substantive evidence when
the physician was consulted to qualify him to testify, even when the state-
ments are of present pain and suffering. McCoRmIcK § 267; WIGMORE
§ 1721. Distinctions between treating and non-treating physicians also are
made when the patient's statements are used only as grounds for the phys-
ician's opinion. Troj v. Smith, 199 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1967) (distinction be-
tween treating and diagnosing physician); Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md.
234, 220 A.2d 537 (1966); Cooper v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 163 N.C. 150,
79 S.E. 418 (1913) (dictum). Contra, Waldrop v. Driver-Miller Plumbing
& Heating Corp., 61 N.M. 412, 301 P.2d 521 (1956); see Ray, Testimony
of Physicians as to Plaintiff's Injuries, 26 TuL. L. REv. 60, 67-69 (1951).
"1 Seawell v. Brame, 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1962) (opinion based
on facts related by patient's wife and others); WIGMORx § 688(4). But see
State Realty Co. v. Ligon, 218 Ala. 541, 119 So. 672 (1929) (opinion
based on report of another doctor); Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md.
546, 39 A.2d 546 (1944) (doctor's opinion based on history given by injured
child's mother). See generally Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Med-
ical Testimony Based in Part Upon Information Received From Third Per-
sons, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 193 (1962).
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ments made to him by his patient for purposes of treatment 22 and,
in doing so, may testify to these statements insofar as they show
the grounds for his opinion.23 Courts adopting this rule have not
disapproved the well established device of the hypothetical question
as a proper method of extracting opinion testimony.24 It seems
rather that asking the doctor to repeat what he has learned of the
case history from his patient and then asking his opinion thereon is
a permissible alternative to the hypothetical question method. To
be logically consistent with a fundamental concept of expert opinion
testimony,25 it would still seem necessary for the facts contained
in the statements to be introduced at some point as substantive
evidence, since a jury cannot be expected to evaluate an opinion,
whether elicited by a hypothetical question or otherwise, without
first being able to determine the validity of its factual basis. 20 Thus
it appears that this rule functions much like the hypothetical ques-
tion. "[T]he only difference is that in the former instance the
witness supplies both the premise and the answer, whereas in the
latter [opinion based on hypothetical question] he supplies only the
one."
27
Despite the similarity between the two methods of admitting
doctors' opinion testimony, the rule allowing a physician to base
his opinion on his patient's subjective statements, and in doing so
to indicate these statements as his premise, seems a desirable one
to maintain. It frees litigants, courts and juries from the mazes
"People v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944); Brown v.
Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 205 A.2d 773 (1964) (dictum); Electro-Motive Div.,
General Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 I1. 2d 35, 203 N.E.2d 408
(1965); State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959). Numerous
authorities for this rule are cited in 31 Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion
Evidence § 108 (1967); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1957); Annot., 65 A.L.R.
1217 (1930).
,3 Lowery v. Jones, 219 Ala. 201, 121 So. 704 (1929) ; Wise v. Monteros,
93 Ariz. 124, 379 P.2d 116 (1963) ; Simpson v. Heiderich, 4 Ariz. App. 232,
419 P.2d 362 (1966) ; Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me. 1966). See also
authorities cited note 22 supra; WIGMORE §§ 655, 1720(1). Annotations col-
lecting cases on this rule can be found in Annot., 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941); 80
A.L.R. 1527 (1932); 67 A.L.R. 10 (1930).
24 See People v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944) (example of
use of both devices in same testimony).
" Cf. WIGMORE § 672.
"Peters v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 107 F.2d 9 (3d Cir.
1939).
"' Reid v. Yellow Cab. Co., 131 Ore. 27, 37, 279 P. 635, 638 (1929) (con-
curring opinion). For example, the doctor might be asked for his opinion
"based on these things the patient told you, to which you have testified."
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and misuses of the hypothetical question.2" Since it is in step with
the common practices of medical science, there seems no compelling
reason to place judicial mistrust on medical opinion based on the
same subjective statements the physician frequently must consider
for purposes of treatment. 9 North Carolina had clearly adopted
this rule in Penland v. Bird Coal Company. ° The Todd decision
places the future of this rule in confusion and doubt.
The effect of Todd on the Penland rule is purely conjectural, since
the majority chose neither to discuss nor cite the earlier case."1 There
are, however, several possible interpretations. First, it may be ar-
gued that Penland has been distinguished and limited to its factual
context.3 2 This possibility stems from the fact that the medical
opinions in these cases are grounded on slightly different types of
statements by the patients. In Penland, a Workmen's Compensation
case,33 plaintiff sought payment for disability suffered from a fall
while at work. His physician repeated what the patient had told
him-a case history of a broken rib, punctured lung, and subsequent
weakness and easy tiring-and gave an opinion as to percentage
of disability based on this history. He did not relate the opinion
8The hypothetical question is frequently criticized by writers. Professor
Wigmore wrote forcefully that "[i]ts abuses have become so obstructive and
nauseous that no remedy short of extirpation will suffice." WIGmoRE § 686.
See also McCoi ICix 33-34 & nn.2 & 3. The North Carolina court recog-
nized the wide dissatisfaction with the hypothetical question in Ingram v.
McCuiston, 261 N.C. 392, 399-400, 134 S.E.2d 705, 711 (1964) (dictum) (six
page hypothetical question).
See WIGMOiRE § 688. Physicians occasionally take the opportunity to
proselytize in court for judicial acceptance of the rule allowing them to
base their opinions on the subjective statements of their patients. See Wise
v. Monteros, 93 Ariz. 124, 126, 379 P.2d 116, 117 (1963) ("'The history
of these cases .. . [is] the only way that a physician can deduce what hap-
pened . . . ."'); Paulk v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 436, 441, 154 S.E.2d 872,
877 (1967) (" '[S]o I can't come in and start feeling of a man's spine-
he's got to tell me something about it. . . .'").
246 N.C. 26, 31, 97 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1957).
s' Part of the confusion resulting from Todd springs from the very fact
that the majority avoided any mention of Penland. The earlier case was
clearly brought to their attention, both by the dissenting opinion and in the
plaintiff's brief. Brief for Appellee at 13.
See Brandis 950.
"The rules of evidence in hearings before administrative tribunals seem
somewhat less stringently enforced. STANSBURY § 4. Hence it might be
argued that the Todd majority considered the Penland rule valid in a hear-
ing before the Industrial Commission, but not in a jury trial. However, the
court in Penland gave no indication that the rule was to be so limited.
Further, had the Todd majority intended to distinguish Penland on this basis,
it seemingly would have done so expressly.
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of disability directly to the fall, but rather to the past symptoms of
the plaintiff.34 In Todd, however, the opinion dealt with and was
based on the patient's statements of external cause (accident and
initial injuries) .3 Due to the trustworthiness and necessity require-
ments of exceptions to the hearsay rule, this distinction between
statements of past symptoms and statements of external cause is
frequently made when the issue is admissibility of the patient's
statements as substantive evidence."6 Even assuming the validity
of this distinction, there seems no strong reason for applying it to
the question of admissibility of opinion .3  The problems and policies
of the hearsay rule are not involved .3  To disallow medical opinion
based on patient's statements of supposed cause is to divest the
doctor of a normal part of his total considerations for purposes
of diagnosis and treatment .3  It simply seems unnecessary and
impractical to balance the outcome of litigation on such a tenuous
distinction.
Another possible effect of Todd is that the Penland rule has been
abandoned altogether. The Todd majority quoted a standard rule
regarding the eliciting of a physician's opinion as to cause by hypo-
thetical question" and stated that "[a] witness is not permitted to
base an opinion on facts of which he has no knowledge, ' 41 but that
:,246 N.C. 26, 30, 97 S.E.2d 432, 435.
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
Compare authorities cited note 14 supra with authorities cited note 15
.rupra.
." See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Express efforts to exclude
medical opinion testimony as to cause when based on patient's history of the
case, including statements of supposed cause, have been rejected by many
courts. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Preston, 257 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1959);
North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Burkett, 281 P.2d 434 (Okla. 1956). See
also WIGMoPE § 688(3) ; Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1100-04 (1959) ; Annot.,
136 A.L.R. 965, 980-82 (1942).
" Cases cited note 17 supra.
" WiGmol § 688(3). Even when a physician would not need to con-
sider possible causes for purposes of diagnosing or treating his patient, there
would seem no need to exclude his opinion based on his patient's statements
of supposed cause.
" , 'It is well settled in the law of evidence that a physician or surgeon
may express his opinion as to the cause of the physical condition of a person
if his opinion is based either upon facts within his personal knowledge, or
upon an assumed state of facts supported by evidence and recited in a hy-
pothetical question."' 269 N.C. 420, 154 S.E.2d 451, quoting from Spivey v.
Newman, 232 N.C. 281, 284, 59 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1950). The court in
Spivey was dealing with the form of a hypothetical question and the phys-
ician's answer. The holding does not appear to address itself to an issue
such as the one in Todd.'4269 N.C. 420, 152 S.E.2d 451. Authority for this proposition came
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"this... is what the doctor purported to do.... The doctor could
not assume the source of the symptoms which plaintiff reported to
him .... -42 The court further stated that "[t] he Physician's opinion
as to possible cause of these symptoms and their probable perman-
ency, should have been elicited as the response to a properly phrased
hypothetical question.. . ."4 The references to "cause" and "source"
in this language lend weight to the aforementioned possibility that
Todd was meant to limit the Penland rule to opinions utilizing pa-
tient's statements of past symptoms. Considered together, however,
the court's observations permit an even broader interpretation: that
in no event will a physician's opinion, if not based on matter within
his personal knowledge, be admissible unless elicited by a hypothet-
ical question. To grant such exclusive status to the hypothetical
question would in effect do away with the Penland rule.
Any final analysis of Todd must depend at least partly on the
reasons for the ruling in that case itself. A main objection of the
court in Todd to the physician's opinion seems to have been the
manner in which it was stated. As phrased by the majority, although
the physician had no personal knowledge of the plaintiff's accident
or initial injuries, "Yet he stated as a fact . . ." that she had low
back injuries and pain and that certain results occurred in or were
caused by her automobile accident. 44 The court stated that "Whether
plaintiff had persistent headaches and continuous backaches and if
so, whether the collision caused them, were crucial questions in the
case."45 This language is reminiscent of the rule that expert opinion
as to cause "invades the province of the jury" if stated in terms
more definite than "could" or "might." 48 The rule has been applied
in cases where improperly phrased hypothetical questions called forth
medical opinions as to cause in terms of certainty analogous to the
situation in Todd.47 Although severely criticized by many courts
from Robbins v. Meyers Trading Post, Inc., 251 N.C. 663, 111 S.E.2d 884
(1959), in which a witness was erroneously allowed to give his opinion as
to the probable value of a house had it been constructed "exactly like" an-
other home, the witness having never seen the other house. Any relation
between this case and the question of admissibility of a physician's opinion
based on his patient's statements is tenuous, at best.
42 269 N.C. at 420-21, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
" Id.
"269 N.C. 420, 152 S.E.2d 451.
,5 rd. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
'See STANiSBURY § 137, at 332-33.
"Stathopoulos v. Shook, 251 N.C. 33, 110 S.E.2d 452 (1959) (injuries
19681
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and writers4" and frequently avoided by technical distinctions, 4
this "could" or "might" rule has never been repudiated by the North
Carolina Court."0 The majority in Todd may have had this concept
in mind. If so, the ruling in the case was possibly intended to pre-
vent prospectively similar errors in opinion testimony as to cause,
since by definition a "properly phrased hypothetical question" must
state the grounds for the opinion as assumptions and elicit that
opinion in the proper "might" or "could" incantation." If this
was the rationale behind the Todd decision, it is arguable that the
holding should be limited in future application to those situations
where the physician's opinion as to cause is sought. Even then use
of the Penland rule should be allowed unless the opinion is stated
in the objectionable terms of certainty."2 This construction of Todd
would leave the Penland rule as a functioning alternative to the
rigors of the hypothetical question. It would also permit complete
restoration of the Penland rule if the "could" or "might" rule is
ever abandoned.53
It seems that a new trial was awarded in Todd-and a practical
evidentiary rule jeopardized to an undeterminable degree-because
the plaintiff found herself on the wrong side of an exceedingly fine
line. It is highly unlikely, in light of all the surgeon's testimony, 4
that the jury considered the part held erroneous as "fact" rather
than opinion as to cause based on certain implicit assumptions.5
"were caused by the collision"); Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E.2d
818 (1912).
'9 .E.g., Griswold v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d
646 (1942). Griswold collects, quotes and discusses both text and case au-
thority in a lengthy opinion criticizing the "invading the province of the
jury" and "could" or "might" rules.
'" STANsBu Y § 137 at 333 & n.67.
" The rule has in fact been reiterated in recent decisions. Apel v. Queen
City Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966) (Higgins, J., quoting
but indicating dissatisfaction with the rule); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262
N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964), noted in 43 N.C.L. REv. 979 (1965).
"1 STANSBURY § 137.
" So long as the "could" or "might" rule remains functional, attorneys
would be wise to instruct their physician-witnesses to avoid stating opinions
as to cause in any terms other than the approved formula, even if the
opinion is to be elicited by the hypothetical question method.
" Since the court has indicated dissatisfaction with the rule, Apel v.
Queen City Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966), its abandon-
ment hopefully is in the near future.
" See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
" It is further relevant to the technicality of the decision that these im-
plicit assumptions were largely uncontradicted. See Brandis 950-51.
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"If any error was involved, it seems hardly prejudicial enough,
standing alone, to justify a new trial, at which the questions will
explicitly state the assumptions clearly implicit in the testimony at
the first trial."'56
Pending judicial exposition of the scope of Todd's effect on
the Penland rule, attorneys should follow the Todd formula of
introducing evidence and having it incorporated into a hypothetical
question designed to elicit carefully phrased opinions of their phy-
sician-witnesses. Caution is advised, for Todd's undermining of
Penland and its spiritual affinity with criticized evidence concepts57
may wipe out verdicts presumptively grounded on medical testimony
which, though uniformly acceptable outside of court, is not twisted
into phrases suitable for the strangely dissimilar ears of jurymen.
RICHARD W. ELLIS
Evidence-Traffic Violations to Impeach a Witness
Although counsel may coach his witness to "assume a virtue, if
you have it not,"' with the witness having a criminal record, it may
be of little avail. Courts have assumed that such a witness does not
have virtue and have not hesitated to allow questions about prior
criminal convictions for impeachment purposes,2 "to reduce or dis-
count the credibility of a witness for the purpose of inducing the
jury to give less weight to his testimony in arriving at the ultimate
facts in the case." 3
In the recent case of Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corporation,4
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was not error for
the trial judge to allow defense counsel on cross examination to
question plaintiff's witness concerning the following convictions:
speeding 65 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone, exceeding
a safe speed, drunken driving, operating a motor vehicle while his
Id. at 951.
See note 28 supra (hypothetical question); note 48 supra ("could" or
"might" rule).
I Shakespeare, Hamlet (III iv 160); see Bander, Shakespeare and the
Law, CASE & COMMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1968 at 47.
2 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 926 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WxGM!ORE].
State v Nelson, 200 N.C. 69, 72, 156 S.E. 154, 156 (1930).
' 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
1968]
